1.1 In 2000 the Guild adopted for information a working paper on stand-alone towers. It reminded the Guild that it was opposed to the concept of de-skilling the profession and posed two questions:

1.2 Does specialisation automatically cause workforce de-skilling?

1.3 Does the centralised provision of Terminal control facilities, when viewed in isolation, unquestionably increase system capacity?

1.4 The concept of a stand-alone tower is one in which the only air traffic control tasks undertaken are in respect of aerodrome control. Usually no opportunity exists for approach control duties to be undertaken and specifically no radar duties are available to the controllers there.

1.5 Additionally stand-alone towers may be contracted to ATC service providers who have no opportunity for controllers to do any other duties within their company.

1.6 This paper acknowledges that economies of scale can be gained by centralising terminal and approach control functions, however the principle justification for such a move should consider safety and deliver operational benefit.

1.7 Differing drivers have now been set for NATS En-route (with safety and delay reduction as priorities) whilst NATS (Airport) Services is driven by safety and cutting costs across the board . This creates a schism between the stand-alone towers and their respective approach radar units because each is seen as having differing management priorities. In consequence, the tower controllers at some locations now tell us that they feel increasingly like 'second class citizens'.

2. Discussion

2.1 De-skilling

2.1.1 In the UK, failure to practice the privileges of a rating will eventually lead to the effective loss of that rating. Controllers are left with redundant skills.

2.1.2 Loss of ratings over time reduces career choices for controllers.

2.1.3 Radar control in particular provides controllers with considerable additional job satisfaction and radar-qualified staff with validations which can, at some units, earn premium salaries. An inability to use radar, or to practice only the most limited of radar services (such as a number two director only) leads to a reduction in overall job satisfaction and potentially less earning opportunity.

2.1.4 In the USA, FAA controllers in stand-alone towers can request a posting to a TRACON after 7 years in the tower. Controllers have expressed some reservation to the Guild about such a policy for the UK. They believe that former radar controllers might have difficulty passing an operational assessment for terminal control having carried out no radar duties for several years. In reality, in the UK, only NATS could offer such a scheme.

2.1.5 Units that can only offer tower duties have difficulty in both recruiting staff and retaining staff. Recent discussions with NATS indicated that NATS accepts this and is concerned, especially in respect of Heathrow manning.

2.2 Terminal capacity

2.2.1 The use of stand-alone towers has occurred in parallel with the development of terminal control centres. This is true in the UK in both the south east and the north west of England. Proposals for the redesign of the Scottish terminal control function may see it move in a similar direction as part of the development of the New Prestwick Centre.

2.2.2 The operational assumption behind a centralised terminal control facility is that where airspace is particularly complex and densely populated, such a centralised operation will benefit capacity. There are numerous routes that interact with each other on a complicated basis. Due to this complexity it is beneficial to have the approach units for the closely located airports in a centralised facility. This set-up facilitates the rapid, co-ordination that is required between the TMA and Approach units and enables a common approach to be adopted towards airspace solutions and in the application of ATC procedures. There are advantages in that staff work more closely as a team and therefore, develop a more harmonious relationship with their colleagues.

2.2.3 Before the centralisation of approach control, there were established and efficient teams at airports. The loss of those teams has, in the opinion of many airfield controllers, been detrimental to service delivery and runway capacity. Airfield controllers find deficiencies in a centralised Terminal Operation, with at some locations, remote controllers directing traffic in and out of an airport they know little about. They typically lack knowledge of relevant aircraft performance in relation to where traffic can vacate the runway and the effect on following traffic. Everything meets on the runway and both radar and tower need to know each other's job intimately for the runway capacity to be high.

2.2.4 Experience shows that, after they are segregated, the relationship between the VCRs and approach radar deteriorates because each side becomes less error tolerant of the other.

2.2.5 Controllers have told the Guild they believe that there are further detrimental effects on controller training due to student controllers’ lack of awareness of the 'opposite' ATC function. The key to coping with, for example, 50 plus movement on a single runway is, in part, the ability to read the radar and ask for the required gaps. With no experience of radar control or techniques this becomes a difficult skill to acquire. It has been suggested to the Guild that unit target training times for controllers will increase, perhaps by as much as 10% to 15%.

3. Conclusions

3.1 Deskilling

3.1.1 Deskilling does occur, with a consequent detrimental effect on recruitment, retention, career development and job satisfaction.

3.2 Terminal Capacity

3.2.1 After several years experience it is notable that experienced airfield controllers remain unconvinced that the existing task division delivers the best runway utilisation. Capacity gains due to the integration of teams and tasks within Terminal Control are believed by these controllers to be less than optimum due to the dismemberment of the existing teams at airports, with consequent reductions in runway utilisation.

3.2.2 It is believed that there is a significant and therefore expensive training overhead implicit in the operation of stand-alone towers.

4. Recommendations

4.1 It is recommended that before any relocation of approach radar services is considered, there should be a formal acceptance that such a change brings a risk of controller deskilling, problems in controller recruitment and retention and a potential loss of runway capacity. New or revised terminal control operations should not therefore assume that centralisation is a one size fits all solution. Airfields should not automatically be denuded of all radar services.

4.2 It is recommended that relevant operational and safety benefits, potential losses in runway utilisation and possible training overheads should be studied before any decision to relocate some or all of an airfield’s radar services to a remote location.

4.3 It is recommended that at airfields where a relocation of radar services is under consideration, controllers should be encouraged to participate in the study of the potential operational benefits and disbenefits that might occur from any such relocation.

4.4 It is recommended that Air Traffic Service providers should review, from time to time, the appropriate location for (in particular) final directors. The study should seek to ensure that the existing operation does in fact provide for maximum runway capacity and should take into account the views of both terminal and airfield controllers.