Title : Automation
Date : 5th September 2003
2003 Policy Forum - WP No. 1/03
Appendix A - Single European Skies - Technical Issues
Appendix B - IFATCA policy on Automation / Human Factors
Appendix C - The Role of the Controller in the future ATM system
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 In 2001 the Guild adopted policy
on computer assistance for controllers. This policy augmented existing
IFATCA policy for use in the UK. We refrained from discussing policy
on automation at that time. The International Federation of Air
Traffic Control Officers (IFATCA) only has policy on what IFATCA terms
the Human Factors elements of Automation. In fact their policy is much
wider in scope than that and it deals with what in the Guild we
describe as "Professional" issues relating to the use of
automation. This policy is reproduced in full in Appendix B.
1.2 Put simply the impact of
automation on controllers will be not only on how controllers work but
also on their role and responsibilities. Controllers have lived in an
environment of constant, if usually gradual, change ever since the Air
Traffic Service was born. It is something controllers expect and
controllers are good at dealing with change. Changes to controllers’
roles and core responsibilities have been less frequent. Such change
has traditionally been treated with caution, even suspicion, yet is in
this area of roles and responsibility that automation will have the
greatest impact. This paper will review the likely impact of
automation on the roles and responsibilities of controllers and will
make recommendations designed to safeguard controllers, especially
from the risk of retaining responsibilities that controllers can no
longer honour.
1.3 A second equally important issue
is what role, if any, we can play in the future in the event of a
catastrophic system failure during peak traffic levels.
1.4 IFATCA Policy is very good at
looking at the impact of automation in these areas. For almost every
aspect of our needs in the UK the policy is practical and relevant.
There is however one paragraph, written some time ago, that may
promote an appealing principle but it does not seem to align with the
issues inherent in future ATC systems that are actually under
development. The paragraph states……….
"Automated tools or systems,
that support the control function, must enable the controller to
retain complete control of the control task in such a way as to enable
the controller to support timely interventions when situations occur
that are outside the normal compass of the system design, or when
abnormal situations occur which require non-compliance or variation to
normal procedures".
And in particular the phrase ",
must enable the controller to retain complete control of the control
task".
1.5 This paper will compare this
policy with the likely effect of deploying so called first generation
controller tools in UK and will seek to identify any anomalies.
1.6 This paper identifies new
policies on automation in ATC to enable the Guild to engage with
providers and regulators on the subject of systems proposed for actual
deployment in the UK. These same systems are under active
consideration for adoption by at least two other major European ATS
providers.
2. DISCUSSION
2.1 The need for additional policy
2.1.1 IFATCA’s policy is supportive
of a human centred solution to ATC automation, a "hybrid"
system in which controllers retain responsibility for their existing
tasks with automation working at the periphery of that task to enhance
the controller’s personal capacity. It proposes that all solutions
proposed by automation would be interpretable by the controller, who
can then apply an informed veto to "unacceptable" solutions.
2.1.2 There is however no evidence of
any ATS provider, investor or system manufacturer developing such a
system. Future ATM systems almost exclusively propose derivatives of a
trajectory based ATC system in which the controller becomes a task
driven problem solver. They assume a significant shift in role and
responsibility for the controller, with many tasks such as conflict
detection, presentation and resolution design assistance being all or
partly automated.
2.1.3 The systems referred to in
2.1.1 have three difficulties to overcome. Firstly there are NO
such systems, yet they will be needed within a decade and they will be
expensive. Secondly they would only be ways of transiting to
automation when in fact the automation is already developed and can be
deployed in the next 10 years. Thirdly they are very easy for non
ATCOs to criticise; as systems designed to perpetuate controller
status and job satisfaction.
2.1.4 We respect IFATCA’s policy in
respect of human centred systems, however with the proposed
introduction of iFACTS in the UK within a decade we also need policy
now on the alternative concept for future ATC to augment IFATCA
policy.
2.2 Features of automated future ATM
systems (based on en-route control examples)
2.2.1 A summary of technical issues
of future ATM systems written by the Guild for IFATCA is reproduced in
Appendix A. Please note that this was written for non controllers.
2.2.2 The Role of the Controller in a
future ATM system as described in the Eurocontrol draft Operational
Concept Document V2 is reproduced in Appendix C.
2.2.3 The normal airspace model
would, as now, be for the airspace of a centre to be divided up into
sectors controlled by a planner and tactical controller. Working with
trajectories tends to change the role of controller teams, as sectors
would frequently inherit partial or even complete solutions to
problems in their own airspace from a preceding sector. It is likely
that these sectors would be relatively symmetrical in shape and the
use of vertical sectorisation would diminish. Theoretically, in the
most advanced concepts for use in 20 or more years, the sectors could
be purely geometric, administrative divisions of airspace between
controller teams.
2.2.4 The control techniques would be
based on minimum intervention techniques, more familiar to oceanic
controllers than domestic airspace controllers. Whether through ground
modelling or networking via datalink, a planning controller would
receive a request to accept a proposed trajectory for an aircraft
approaching the sector. Trajectory proposals replace existing
co-ordination techniques, which seek to fix conditions for an aircraft’s
entry into the sector against a known point in space through which the
aircraft will pass. In at trajectory based system the aircraft’s
position in four dimensions is "known" at every point along
its route. Unless there is a known conflict or promulgated procedural
constraint the controller’s task is to facilitate the proposed
trajectory without imposing any constraint. This is accomplished
through a series of tasks that are presented to the controller for
action.
2.3 The future roles and
responsibility of controllers
2.3.1 Appendix C
draws together various paragraphs from the draft version 2 of the
Eurocontrol Operational Concept Document. Two significant paragraphs
are reproduced below.
2.2.2 "At
present the most important cognitive processes of the multiple tasks
conducted by the controller are the perception of information,
information selection, information integration, planning, and
decision-making and the maintenance of a mental picture of the air
traffic situation (situational awareness). A major issue in this area
will be whether or not it is possible, with a change of roles, to
rearrange the situational and cognitive elements which feed awareness
so that a controller only has to keep a mental picture of a limited
portion of the overall traffic situation". (Eurocontrol
Operational Concept Document)
2.3.3 "Tools
for conflict detection and conflict resolution are likely to impact on
the knowledge and prediction of future events.. The higher the level
of automation is, the more difficult is maintaining the situational
awareness. Therefore human machine interfaces will have a deep impact
on controllers possibilities to handle unusual situations and it is
crucial to keep the interface appropriate and intuitive."
(Eurocontrol Operational Concept Document)
2.3.4 Trajectory based systems would
employ medium term conflict detection, and to all intents the task of
conflict detection is automated. When a conflict is identified, its
presentation is also displayed using automated tools. These may show
the relationship between conflicting aircraft in both vertical and
azimuth displays, as well as indications of how soon conflicts will
occur, how close aircraft are forecast to come and what type of
conflict it is expected to be. The controller’s task is to take the
conflict predictions as presented, to prioritise and then to resolve
them.
2.4 System failure, the controller’s
role.
2.4.1
"Automation needs to be implemented in a way that allow the human
to build on his ability to ensure safe recovery of real time events,
should system failure occur. Operational concepts, procedures and the
design of automated systems have to include such properties if a safe
operation should be assured. (Eurocontrol Operational Concept
Document)
2.4.2 One purpose of automation is to
enhance system capacity by taking the ATC system to a capacity level
that cannot be achieved by manual techniques. Should therefore a
catastrophic system failure occur the controllers could in the worst
case be presented with a traffic situation beyond their ability to
interpret or control. The OCD acknowledges in paras 2.2.2 and 2.2.3
the possibility of a degradation of situation awareness and other
skills and that a human will need assistance in the event of a
failure.
3. CONCLUSIONS
3.1 It is the case that the impact of
automation will cause a change of role and that the change will make
it unwise for controllers to continue to accept responsibilities that
will become increasingly difficult to fulfil.
3.2 The increasing use if controller
tools, and the evolution to a task driven role could impair a
controllers "picture" and make a controller increasingly
dependent on automation.
3.3 System algorithms and logic,
designed by scientists and engineers, are often at variance with the
mental processes of controllers. Although a machine and a controller
may designed the same solution, the process by which a machine
develops it conclusions is not necessarily obvious or logical to a
controller. This makes it difficult for a controller to validate the
output of automation, even if the controller had time to do so.
3.4 Peak traffic levels will be
sustainable only with the contribution of automation. In the event of
a catastrophic system failure under peak traffic conditions, a
controller’s ability to provide an effective manual recover will be
so limited that an alternative approach should be considered and
implemented.
4. RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1 This Guild is not opposed in
principle to the introduction of automation in the form of controller
tools, decision support tools, automated tools and assistance. However
in order to protect controllers it believes that the introduction of
such systems has wider implications than just the technical issues and
that a wider debate on the proposed introduction is required.
4.2 The proposed introduction of
controller tools, decision support tools, automated tools and assistance
requires in each case a formal operational, human factors and regulatory
review of the impact on the future role and responsibility of
controllers.
4.3 The review should consider in
particular:
The potential degradation of the
controller’s dynamic traffic model "the picture" and the
impact of any such degradation on the ability of a controller to
honour existing responsibilities.
The potential for controllers to
become reliant on the tools and the consequences of that.
The controller’s ability to safely
contribute at all to continuing service provision in the event of a
catastrophic system failure at peak periods.
Appendix A
Single European Skies -
Technical Issues
Look behind the apparently
huge variety of technical solutions proposed to provide more airspace
capacity and it is clear that only one solution is on offer. That solution
is to manage the trajectories of aircraft and to absorb capacity delays on
the ground, so that once an aircraft is airborne only minimum intervention
by air traffic control is necessary. There are however many ways proposed
to achieve this solution, and each poses as many questions as it answers.
There is for example a great debate about the future roles of both pilots
and controllers in this new organisation and about the use of automation
in the cockpit and the controller’s work station.
Lets start by clarifying
briefly how ATC in Europe works now, and then try to identify what changes
are to come and what issues they raise.
Air Traffic Control in
Europe is currently divided up into six specialist areas:
Aerodrome control, the bit
the public sees, where controllers in the visual control room of a
control tower separate aircraft on and in the vicinity of an airfield
from each other, vehicles and obstructions.
Approach control, which
separates arriving, departing and over-flying aircraft at an airfield.
Terminal control, which
separates aircraft operating into and out of multiple airfield groupings
Enroute control, known as
Area control, which controls aircraft flying between airports or airport
groups.
Oceanic control, a self
explanatory but highly specialised control task which increasingly used
satellite technology to enable aircraft to make automated position
reports and to provide a communications link between pilot and
controller. The satellites are used to relay those instructions and
reports from over the horizon, enabling controllers to separate aircraft
over many thousands of kilometres.
Military control, another
specialist area, which controls military traffic between military
airfields and between military airfields and training areas.
Each control unit also
provides a flight information service to pilots and an alerting service in
the event that an aircraft suffers an emergency. Each type of air traffic
control service is usually provided within some kind of dedicated or
"controlled" airspace into or within which flight can only take
place with the permission of air traffic control. An airfield might have a
control zone, which is linked with other airfields close by through a
terminal control area. These terminal control areas are in turn linked by
airways, aerial autobahns at least 10 nautical miles wide and hundreds of
thousands of feet high.
The airspace allocated to
terminal control or area control can be very large. This airspace may be
divided up between one or more air traffic control units, and within each
unit the airspace is further divided into sectors. Each sector will be
controlled by at least one controller, but it is more likely that a team
at least two controllers will be responsible for a sector.
People outside aviation
often misunderstand the term "separation" as applied between two
aircraft. Separation is not just collision avoidance. Collision avoidance
is achieved by the use of an extreme manoeuvre by one or both aircraft.
Separation is achieving by applying internationally agreed flight times or
physical distances between aircraft. Aircraft are usually separated
vertically by a distance of 1000 feet. If a controller is using radar to
separate two aircraft, the lateral distance required between the two
aircraft is usually five nautical miles. Manoeuvres that aircraft fly to
ensure that separation is achieved are quite gentle. A passenger may never
even notice the change in attitude, heading or height.
Holding is another often
misunderstood procedure. Aircraft do not arrive at an airport in a regular
controlled sequence, and the rate of arrival may exceed the landing rate.
If an airfield can land 30 planes per hour and the airlines and the
airport schedule 40 per hour, the surplus of 10 flights must be held in
the air. The aircraft usually fly in a regular pattern overhead a radio
beacon until such time as they can be accepted by the airfield. Holding is
a technique that allows controllers to accept aircraft in large numbers
and then regulate the flow of arriving traffic to match the runway's
capacity.
In some areas of Europe's
airspace, unrestricted air traffic flows would overload airspace, routes
and controllers and would risk losses of separation between aircraft. To
prevent this a process called air traffic flow management is applied,
centred on Eurocontrol's Central Flow Management Unit in Brussels. This
unit issues "slots" in the form of permission for an aircraft to
use European airspace providing its takeoff within, or entry into,
Europe's airspace takes place at a certain time.
Now lets consider how the
system might evolve by 2025.
In current air traffic
control systems, enabling an aircraft to climb and reach its requested
flight level and follow its required route is achieved through the
culmination of a series of actions by several controllers at one or more
units.
This technique has evolved
to control aircraft when, for planning purposes, controllers have a
precise estimate of the aircraft’s future position only at certain
pre-determined points, but not at every point on its trajectory.
Effectively they have only a three dimensional knowledge of an aircraft’s
position at each of a number of significant points along its cleared
route. Planning separation is therefore limited to identifying and
resolving conflicts at these points, with a reliance on radar monitoring
and tactical control to resolve other conflicts that may arise between
these significant points.
Future technical concepts
for Air Traffic Management in Europe intend to escape from the limitations
of this three-dimensional straitjacket in order that controllers can have
knowledge of the entirety of the trajectory of an aircraft. This allows
the controller to approve or design conflict free trajectories based on
the user-preferred trajectory of the aircraft. In order for such a system
to work, alternative conflict detection and conflict presentation systems
are required and these are described as decision support or advanced
tools.
To give an example of how an
advanced tool might be deployed, take as an example an aircraft departing
to the south from Glasgow airport in Scotland. The aircraft is requesting
a cruising level of 37,000 feet or Flight Level (FL) 370. Currently the
aircraft’s trajectory is achieved only after several height constraints
are imposed. These might be at seven thousand feet by Glasgow airport, FL
250 by the Galloway sector, and then a number of options during which
further climb may be permitted by a higher Scottish sector and/or one or
two London sectors before the final flight level is achieved. In addition
certain potential conflicts may be detected and so additional level
constraints and lateral deviations may be issued.
In the future, by using
computer assistance and automation, the Galloway controller would know
before the aircraft even called what, if any, conflicts there were along
the next 500 km or more of the aircraft’s route. If there were none,
there is no reason why the Galloway controller could not climb the
aircraft without any constraints imposed. Currently such a climb requires
approval in advance between sectors, a process known as co-ordination. In
the future, other sectors along the aircraft's trajectory would inherent
the Galloway controller’s solution. As all sectors and centres would
work from the same networked data then all other aircraft in the sectors
along the route that interacted with the Glasgow departure would be known
in one form or another to the Galloway controller.
When sufficient aircraft are
fitted with the appropriate equipment, the modelling of aircraft
trajectories can be improved by obtaining actual trajectory data from the
aircraft via an automated air/ground datalink. The overall aim of these
changes is to provide controllers with increasing degrees of separation
assurance between aircraft trajectories and also to provide both medium
term conflict alerting and safety nets to detect evolving or sudden
changes in the traffic scenario.
The most comprehensive
demonstration of how Europe's Air Traffic Control could evolve over a
quarter of a century was conducted under Eurocontrol's PHARE programme
that sought to bring together ideas for the control of aircraft in all
phases of flight. PHARE demonstrated an air traffic control system in
which early conflict detection, and the early presentation of those
conflicts to controllers, was automated. The controller's responsibility
was to resolve the conflicts by manipulating the trajectories of
conflicting aircraft. As four dimensional trajectories can be difficult
for a controller to interpret manually, computer assistance is required to
help the controller interpret any conflicts and then to design solutions
that require minimum intervention with the aircraft's preferred
trajectory. The use of air ground datalink is an essential component in
requesting trajectories from aircraft, offering pilots conflict free
trajectories and allowing some negotiation between pilot and controller.
In order to eliminate
holding under normal circumstances, delay would be absorbed on the ground
before departure. Networked traffic management systems would determine the
takeoff time and arrival time, and would calculate any speed or route
changes required enabling the aircraft to arrive at its destination
without having to hold.
So what are the technical
issues to be resolved between now and 2025 in order for air traffic
control to meet the required capacity?
Ensure that controllers in
Europe receive all the necessary information on every flight that will
enter their airspace. That information needs to be presented to
controllers at a time and in a way that allows the controller to detect
and resolve conflicts through the application of standard separations,
even if the method by which they are applied relies on automation.
Ensure that controllers in
Europe receive all the necessary information on what airspace and routes
are available to them in order to provide aircraft with conflict free
routings that match as closely as possible to the aircraft's preferred
trajectories.
Even a relatively
conventional new air traffic control system can take up to eight years to
introduce. Many of the more ambitious projects world-wide have taken
typically between twelve and fifteen years. Over the next 10 years,
European air traffic control will need to commission several generations
of digital networked systems all arguably more complex than those in
operation today.
Many of the planned
improvements in air traffic control will require equivalent equipment
changes in aircraft too. Many of those aircraft that will be flying in
public transport service in 2025 are already on order, under construction,
or even already in service. The airlines, or the aircraft lessors, who are
buying these new aircraft, have not always specified those essential
systems and so they will need to be retro-fitted at additional cost.
If controllers are to
control double the number of aircraft that they do now, then they will
become reliant on automation in the form of decision support tools
designed to augment the personal ability of controller. These tools will
enable controllers to discard existing and highly valued skills and
require them to adopt new and perhaps less challenging tasks. One skill
that controllers will lose through lack of usage is their existing
monitoring ability, through which they maintain their "picture"
the dynamic mental model that controllers use to interpret all the items
of information that influence the way each flight is controlled. This
raises two major issues.
How, if at all, can a system
failure under peak traffic load be managed using manual fallback
procedures?
Will a controller possess or
retain the ability to check safety critical information provided by
automated systems? It seem unlikely that the controller will be able to do
so and so responsibilities that controllers currently hold for detecting
conflicts or (if solutions are found using computer assistance) for
resolving conflicts cannot be honoured. The controller will have become
dependent on software, whose algorithms they cannot validate, to detect
and interpret conflicts and to design conflict free trajectories.
Finally, much has been said
about the need for parallel investment in airports to prevent a capacity
crisis. If that investment is not forthcoming then it may be necessary to
question the need for the anticipated high investment in air traffic
control, as capacity will become capped by runway and terminal
availability.
Appendix B
B1 AUTOMATION / HUMAN
FACTORS
B1.1 IFATCA POLICY is that :
a) Automation must
improve and enhance the data exchange for controllers. Automated
systems must be fail-safe and provide accurate and incorruptible data.
These systems must be built with an integrity factor to review and
crosscheck the information being received.
b) The Human Factors
aspects of Automation must be fully considered when developing
automated systems.
c) Automation must
assist and support ATCOs in the execution of their duties.
d) The controller must
remain the key element of the ATC system.
e) Total workload should
not be increased without proof that the combined automated/human
systems can operate safely at the levels of workload predicted, and to
be able to satisfactorily manage normal and abnormal occurrences.
f) Automated tools or
systems, that support the control function, must enable the controller
to retain complete control of the control task in such a way so as to
enable the controller to support timely interventions when situations
occur that are outside the normal compass of the system design, or
when abnormal situations occur which require non-compliance or
variation to normal procedures.
g) Automation should be
designed to enhance controller job satisfaction.
h) The legal aspects of
a controller's responsibilities must be clearly identified when
working with automated systems .
i) A Controller shall
not be held liable for incidents that may occur due to the use of
inaccurate data if he is unable to check the integrity of the
information received.
j) A Controller shall
not be held liable for incidents in which a loss of separation occurs
due to a resolution advisory issued by an automated system."
Appendix C
C.1
The Role of the Controller in the future ATM system (from the
Eurocontrol draft operational concept document)
C1.1 The implementation
of the increasing number of automated tools and technologies in
Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) together with the
enhancement of harmonised and integrated civil/military co-ordination
and airspace management plans and procedures will have a considerable
impact on the working practices of civil and military ATM staff.
C1.2 At present the most
important cognitive processes of the multiple tasks conducted by the
controller are the perception of information, information selection,
information integration, planning, and decision-making and the
maintenance of a mental picture of the air traffic situation
(situational awareness). A major issue in this area will be whether or
not it is possible, with a change of roles, to rearrange the
situational and cognitive elements which feed awareness so that a
controller only has to keep a mental picture of a limited portion of
the overall traffic situation.
C1.3 The trend will be
towards the evolution of a new working environment in which task
sharing aims are focused on enhancing the differing strengths of human
and machine and minimising their limitations, rather than using
machines to replicate the controller’s current tasks (an analogy can
be drawn with the impact of the relatively recent introduction of 2-D
radar information within the controller’s work environment when
compared to the previous procedural methods of working).
C1.4 The concept
incorporates an evolving change to the current ATM environment in
respect of roles and responsibilities, both on the ground, and between
the air and the ground ATM elements. The greater use of computer
support tools, and associated communications systems, to facilitate
autonomous operations, and a move to more dynamic airspace structures
will lead to the re-allocation of tasks and responsibilities.
C1.5 As a consequence,
the operational task of controllers will shift from perception and
response oriented involvement towards increase in management and
planning tasks with intervention by exception. This shift also
implicates new personnel within the ATM environment such as system
engineers. Maintenance of the automated systems requires new
qualifications. Organisational issues related to system monitoring and
maintenance will become a safety issue.
C1.6 In the long term,
the traditional clear distinction of tasks between planner and
tactical controller is expected to overlap more and more, since
automated systems allow both to interact on the planning level. The
interaction with the technical system will become less transparent
between tactical and planning controller.
C1.7 Human-Human and
Human-Machine task sharing will be employed both on the ground (in the
control team), and between the air and the ground (between the
flight-crew and control team). Only the evaluation of realistic task
sharing within new environments can determine the impact on the
current human role, and what measures will be needed to allow the
human to retain the ultimate responsibility for real-time aircraft
separation. The types of ATC organisations best suited to the future
ATM system, including flexible and dynamic multi-sectors and planning,
will be selected to best suit the traffic patterns and the provision
of safe services, while matching the human factor requirements.
Several options are possible. These are not necessarily mutually
exclusive and are the subject of on-going investigation.
C1.8 Human Factors
research in ATM suggests that there are seven main interacting factors
that need to be addressed to ensure partnership between automated
support and the controller. These are:
Trust - The ultimate use
of automated tools will depend on the humans trust in its their
reliability. Neither mistrust nor complacency are desirable..
Situational awareness -
Tools for conflict detection and conflict resolution are likely to
impact on the knowledge and prediction of future events.. The higher
the level of automation is, the more difficult is maintaining the
situational awareness. Therefore human machine interfaces will have a
deep impact on controllers possibilities to handle unusual situations
and it is crucial to keep the interface appropriate and intuitive.
Team performance -
Automation will affect the interactions and communication patterns of
controllers and interactions with supervisors and with pilots. The
added value of good team resource management to the safe performance
and execution of expeditious air traffic management is high.
Skill changes – When
certain aspects of a task are automated, the human operator will no
longer experience the daily on–the-line handling of the tasks this
may consequently result in a reduced performance of the skill
involved. New technology will on the other hand require new skills to
be trained and new knowledge to acquire.
Workload - Much of the
automation being developed is intended to reduce controller workload,
or to smooth the current workload levels Caution needs to be applied
as experience from other industries suggests generally that whilst
there are reductions, they rarely meet the intended levels.
Recovery from system
failure - Automation needs to be implemented in a way that allow the
human to build on his ability to ensure safe recovery of real time
events, should system failure occur. Operational concepts, procedures
and the design of automated systems have to include such properties if
a safe operation should be assured.
Error analysis - The
introduction of automatic system promises to reduce or remove some
forms of human errors presently seen. Changing the characteristics of
the system will however alter the human-machine interaction and will
therefore introduce other types of human error and many decrease
system error detectability and recoverability.
C2
Evolution of Roles and Responsibilities
C2.1 The roles and
responsibilities of Controllers have evolved from knowing the last
reported position of the aircraft (Procedural) to knowing, with the
advent of radar, its current position (Radar Control). This evolution
generated new responsibilities for controllers related to directing
air traffic and, in some specific cases, moved the responsibility for
navigating the aircraft and maintaining separation from the pilot to
the controller.
C2.2 At present many
controllers handle tasks linearly, i.e. one at a time, and very
quickly. This is more skill or rule-based, and accounts for the very
high level of service given to air traffic. With automation there is a
good chance that some tasks will become more knowledge-based,
requiring thinking and interpretation time. This could mean a
difference between thinking for up to ten seconds about a particular
decision and then making it, and having to think for a minute or so
before making the decision.
C2.3 One of the major
contributions of automation will be the possibility of accurately
anticipating the future position of aircraft. This new possibility is
seen as an important issue that will contribute to generating capacity
and providing flexibility.
C2.4 Additionally, the
use of datalink will also contribute to alter the means and substance
of pilot /controller communications. Controllers will also have to
adapt the mental models that drive their actions, as airspace
restructuring progresses. Technological advancements will enable
different hardware and software capabilities in the air and on the
ground which all together will have new implications on the roles and
responsibilities of the ATM staff. The team performance between
Controllers, those supporting the Controllers, Pilots and other
personnel like system designers and system operators will become
essential for safety, efficiency and capacity.
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